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Abstract 
What allows groups to behave intelligently? One suggestion is that groups exhibit a 
collective intelligence accounted for by number of women in the group, turn-taking and emotional 
empathizing, with group-IQ being only weakly-linked to individual IQ (Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, 
Hashmi, & Malone, 2010). Here we report tests of this model across three studies with 312 people. 
Contrary to prediction, individual IQ accounted for around 80% of group-IQ differences. Hypotheses 
that group-IQ increases with number of women in the group and with turn-taking were not 
supported. Reading the mind in the eyes (RME) performance was associated with individual IQ, and, 
in one study, with group-IQ factor scores. However, a well-fitting structural model combining data 
from studies 2 and 3 indicated that RME exerted no influence on the group-IQ latent factor (instead 
having a modest impact on a single group test). The experiments instead showed that higher 
individual IQ enhances group performance such that individual IQ determined 100% of latent 
group-IQ. Implications for future work on group-based achievement are examined.  
 
* We examined group-IQ in three independent studies. 
* Gender balance and turn-taking were unrelated to group performance. 
* Social sensitivity had no impact on latent group-IQ. 
* Individual IQ emerged as the cause of group-IQ. 
* Group-IQ almost exclusively reflects individual cognition. 
Keywords: Collective intelligence; Group IQ; IQ, gender; communication; group psychology, 
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Introduction 
While humans form groups and value group membership (Haidt, 2007; Lewis & Bates, 
2010), this has typically been understood in terms of obedience and loyalty adaptations maximizing 
goal completion (Simon, 1997). Recently, Woolley et al. (2010) reported a new possible benefit of 
group work: the emergence of a collective intelligence factor largely unrelated to individual IQ. 
They reported that people working on complex problems in groups show a strong general-ability or 
IQ factor, with significant differences between groups on this factor. Surprisingly, group-IQ, or 
“collective intelligence” (C) as they termed it was “not strongly correlated with the average or maximum 
individual intelligence of group members but is correlated with the average social sensitivity of group members, 
the equality in distribution of conversational turn-taking, and the proportion of females in the group.” 
Woolley et al. (2010, p. 686). These findings were subsequently argued to warrant a “seismic shift in 
how we study groups” (Woolley & Malone, 2011, p. 2). 
As the editors of Nature (Nature Editorial, 2016) recently commented regarding replication 
studies “researchers must make more of them, funders must encourage them and journals must publish them.” 
(p 373). Here, in three independent samples, we therefore tested these hypotheses, and contrasted 
these against the hypothesis that group-IQ predominantly reflects individual cognitive ability. 
For some time, it has been known that work-groups whose team-members have higher IQ 
out-perform teams of less-able members (Devine & Philips, 2001). Against this background, 
Woolley et al. (2010) asked whether groups themselves exhibit a general-factor of intelligence, if 
this might be distinct from individual IQ, and, if so, what the origins of such a collective intelligence 
might be. Woolley et al. (2010) assessed individual IQ using either Raven’s matrices (Raven & 
Court, 1998) or the Wonderlic Personnel Test – a brief multiple-choice measure of intelligence 
(Wonderlic & Hovland, 1939). Social sensitivity was assessed using the Reading the Mind in the 
Eyes (RME) task (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001). RME involves subjects 
viewing images of expressive faces, masked to show only the eye region, and choosing which of four 
words plotted around the image best describes the depicted emotion. To assess group-IQ, subjects 
were allocated to small groups and performed tasks including brainstorming, matrix reasoning, 
moral reasoning, planning a shopping trip, and collaborative text editing (See Wooley et al. 2010 
supplementary Tables S1a and S3b for range of tasks used in their study 1 and study 2) . These 
reflect the McGrath (1984) Task Circumplex – an established taxonomy for measuring group 
performance. The four quadrants of the circumplex are: (1) ‘Generate’ – development of new ideas; 
(2) ‘Choose’ – tasks that require definitive correct answers; (3) ‘Negotiate’ –resolving conflicts of 
interest or points of view; and (4) ‘Execute’: performance and psychomotor tasks. A confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) indicated that a single latent factor accounted for 31-35% of test variance. 
Surprisingly, individual IQ accounted for just 3% of group-IQ variance. 
Turning to the causes of this group-IQ factor, Woolley et al. (2010) reported a significant (r 
= 0.23, p = 0.007) correlation with percent females in the group. Variance in turn-taking during 
communication similarly correlated positively and significantly with group-IQ. In multiple 
regression models, these factors were displaced by social sensitivity (RME), which was the best 
predictor of group-IQ. Their conclusion was that a distinct form of collective intelligence exists 
which can solve complex problems independent of the IQs of individual group members. If social 
sensitivity enables a collective problem solving ability not limited by conventional cognitive ability 
of the group members this would clearly be of profound importance, especially given that simply 
increasing female participation and encouraging turn-taking might allow us to increase collective 
ability. 
Given the ubiquitous importance of group activities (Simon, 1997) these results have wide 
implications. Rather than hiring individuals with high cognitive skill who command higher salaries 
(Ritchie & Bates, 2013), organizations might select-for or teach social sensitivity thus raising 
collective intelligence, or even operate a female gender bias with the expectation of substantial 
performance gains. While the study has over 700 citations and was widely reported to the public 
(Woolley, Malone, & Chabris, 2015), to our knowledge only one replication has been reported 
(Engel, Woolley, Jing, Chabris, & Malone, 2014). This study used online (rather than in-person) 
tasks and did not include individual IQ. We therefore conducted three replication studies, reported 
below. 
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Study 1 
Based on Woolley et al. (2010), we set out to confirm replication of the following 
hypotheses. First, in a battery of group-tasks, a single factor should account for a substantial portion 
of variance in scores. Second, individual IQ would be a poor (path-coefficient ≤ .20) predictor of 
group-IQ. Third, number of women in the group would predict group-IQ. And fourth, social 
sensitivity would strongly account for variance in group-IQ, explaining for the predicted apparent 
association of number of women with group-IQ, and greatly exceeding any effect of individual 
cognitive ability. 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-two (41 females, 31 males) student participants were recruited using Facebook and 
university class e-mail lists. The age range of participants was eighteen to twenty-four years of age. 
One subject was in full time employment. Subjects were offered a £50 prize for the best performing 
group. For collective IQ testing, these 72 subjects were formed into 26 groups as described below). 
Materials 
Individual IQ was assessed using the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (Raven & 
Court, 1998), a standardized test of general fluid reasoning capacity. Participants were given 10 
minutes to complete as many as possible of the odd-numbered items of set-II of this test and were 
scored for total correct, as in Woolley et al (2010) study 1. 
Note: When conducting these studies, we expected a group-IQ factor to emerge independent 
of IQ, and wished to consider alternative models for collective cooperation based on personality and 
moral psychology. For this reason, subjects in study one completed the NEO-FFI Five Factor 
Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrea, 1992) while in studies 2 and 3, subjects completed the 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) and a measure of psychopathy 
(Christie & Geis, 1970). We had no need to explain results based on these ancillary scales, and for 
this reason they are not analyzed or presented here.  
Individual Social Sensitivity was assessed using the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). This 35-item test involves viewing pictures of emotional expressions 
cropped to just the eye-region, and picking the correct descriptor from among three foil words. 
 
Group-IQ Assessment Tasks 
Tasks used to assess group-IQ were 1) Brainstorming, 2) Group Ravens, 3) Plan Shopping 
Trip, and 4) Architectural Design. These were selected based on their factor loadings in Woolley et 
al (2010) Study 1. 
Brainstorming draws on Quadrant 1 of the McGrath circumplex, and involved each group 
writing down as many possible uses for both a brick and of a paperclip, with five minutes given for 
each item. Responses were scored following Wilson, Guilford, and Christensen (1953) and based on 
the number of uses generated, originality and the frequency in comparison to other groups. 
Group Ravens (Quadrant 2) involved groups completing as many of the even numbered 
questions in set II of Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998b) as 
they could in 10 minutes, scored for the number of correctly answered items. In group planning 
(Quadrant 2) each group planned a shopping trip as if they were members of a household buying 
groceries. Members each had a different list of items they needed to collect whilst sharing a single 
car. Various constraints were put in place, for example certain items like milk would spoil after 45 
minutes. There are better and worst places for members to buy different items for example some 
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shops sell better quality items and some shops sell cheaper items. The goal was to make a plan in 
which they purchased as many high-value items as possible whilst adhering to the constraints. 
Teams received 5-minutes of instructions and then had 15 minutes to complete the task. 
The architecture task (Quadrant 3: negotiation) followed Woolley et al. (2010) and involved 
each group designing and building a model house from a limited set of building blocks. Essential 
features were one door, two windows and a roof. Teams were given 5-minutes to organize, and 15-
minutes to complete the task. Structures were scored on size, durability and aesthetic quality, and 
received penalties if they failed to conform to the essential criteria. We thank a reviewer who asked 
us to note that in Woolley et al, (2010) teams built a house, garage, and pool, receiving 15 minutes 
of instructions, 10 minutes of planning, and 20 minutes to build; here, teams built a house with one 
door, two windows and a roof with 5 minutes to plan and 15 minutes to build. 
Finally, a computerized game of checkers was administered. Used as a criterion task by 
(Woolley et al., 2010), we selected this task based on its factor performance, and analyzed it 
(equivalently) as additional manifest measure of collective ability. Group members played checkers 
against a computerized opponent. Members were first familiarized with the rules of the game, then 
given time for a short practice match and lastly played one test match against the computer 
opponent. Teams received one point for every move they made, two points for every piece they took 
and three points for each king they earned.  Only the scores in the test match were used. 
Procedure  
After informed consent, each participant was asked to complete three individual tasks: The 
individual-Raven IQ test; the personality measure; and the mind-in-eyes measure. Subjects were 
allocated at random into groups of size 2 (12 groups), 3 (8 groups), or 4 (6 groups)– a total of 26 
groups. Subjects then completed the five group-IQ tasks. One group did not complete the 
architecture task due to a procedural error. 
Results 
Mean (and SD) for individual Ravens and RME raw scores were 12.23 (2.9) and 26.76 (3.35) 
respectively. Scores on the individual Ravens and on RME were averaged within each group, and 
these formed our primary predictors of performance on the group-IQ tasks. Correlations among 
these group-IQ tasks are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Study 1 means, SDs, and correlations for each measure. 
 Group 
Brainstorm 
Group 
Design 
Group 
Shopping 
Group 
Raven 
Group 
Checkers 
Individual 
Raven 
Mean 
RME 
Group Brainstorming 1       
Group Building Design 0.43 1      
Group Shopping plan 0.42 0.19 1     
Group Raven’s IQ 0.37 0.17 0.73 1    
Group Checkers 0.56 0.33 0.37 0.32 1   
Mean Individual Raven 0.15 0.07 0.63 0.73 -0.01 1  
Mean Individual RME 0.09 0.02 0.22 0.46 -0.14 0.53 1 
Mean (SD) 62.96 
(12.04) 
23.36 
(2.39) 
48.19 
(16.93) 
13.96 
(2.55) 
75.12 
(14.21) 
12.34 
(2.04) 
26.78 
(2.42) 
 
A parallel analysis (Horn, 1965) was conducted to determine evidence for the number of 
factors in the data. This indicated a single general factor be retained (adjusted Eigenvalues 1.98, 
0.85, 0.69, 0.69, 0.79). This single factor accounted for 39.8% of variance. Testing fit of a 1-factor 
model using structural equation modeling using OpenMx (Neale et al., 2015) and umx (Bates, 2014; 
Bates, Neale, & Maes, 2017) packages in R (R Core Team, 2016). This indicated that a model with 
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one modification (a covariance between brain storming and group checkers) fit well (χ²(113) = 4.2, 
p = 0.380; CFI = 0.993; TLI = 0.984; RMSEA = 0.043). In the original report, group-IQ scores 
generated from the factor analysis using Bartlett’s method for deriving factor-scores. Because we 
had a well-fitting structural model and raw data, we computed latent-factor scores using full-
information maximum likelihood modelling (Estabrook & Neale, 2013) to retain information from 
the group with four rather than five test results. All results were highly similar with both methods.    
Testing causes of group-IQ differences 
Our hypotheses regarding the causes of variation in group-IQ scores were tested using a 
multiple regression with group-IQ score as the dependent variable, and with group size, number of 
women in the group, along with average individual IQ and average RME scores as predictors. This 
model accounted for 57% of variance in group-IQ scores, but among the predictors, only individual 
IQ was significant (β = 0.76 [0.4, 1.12], t = 4.37, p < 0.001). Neither proportion-female (β = 0.12 
[-0.2, 0.43], t = 0.77, p = 0.447) nor reading the mind in the eyes (β = -0.11 [-0.48, 0.25], t = -
0.65, p = 0.520) were significant. Size of the group approached significance (β = 0.28 [-0.03, 0.59], 
t = 1.87, p = 0.075) suggesting that more people could perhaps accomplish more work. The model 
could be simplified to one containing only individual IQ as a predictor without significant loss of fit 
(model comparison F(3, 24) = 1.562, p = 0.23). 
Discussion 
In this first of three studies, we were able to replicate a general factor accounting for over 
1/3 of variance in group-IQ test scores. This factor, however, showed strong (rather than weak) 
loadings on individual IQ. The reported link of group-IQ to numbers of women in the group failed 
to emerge, and social sensitivity failed to emerge as a significant predictor of group-IQ. This study 
(the lowest-powered of the three reported here) had 58% power to detect the reported .36 effect from 
social sensitivity to group-IQ (controlling for individual IQ) reported in the largest study of 
Woolley et al. (2010). The measure of individual IQ (Raven) meant that in study 1, similar test 
material appeared in both the individual IQ measure and in one of the group tasks. We note that 
because the “collective intelligence factor” model Woolley et al. (2010) demands a very weak link 
between group-IQ and individual IQ, and because the group-IQ factor can represent only variance 
common to all tasks, the collective intelligence factor model predicts such test overlap cannot 
generate the link we observed between individual cognition and group-IQ. Nevertheless, we 
thought it desirable to use the Wonderlic IQ test used in the original study 2. For these reasons, we 
undertook two additional replications, both larger in size (with studies 2 and 3 yielding a combined 
95% power to detect a 0.36 effect of social sensitivity on the group-IQ factor), and using the identical 
individual IQ measure as was used in Woolley et al (2010) study 2. 
Replication Study 2  
In 40 groups, assessed using a total of five group-IQ tasks, we tested the hypotheses that 
these group tests formed a general group-IQ factor, and that turn-taking, numbers of women, and 
social sensitivity would be significantly associated with group-IQ scores, contrasting these with 
models in which individual IQ was the predominant predictor of group scores. 
Method 
Subjects: Forty teams of 3 participants were recruited from the public in the city of Chennai, India 
via contacts made by SG. Sixty-five subjects were male (mean age 26 years, SD 6.1), and 55 were 
female (mean 26 years, SD 5.8). Subjects were incentivized by a prize of 6000 Indian Rupee raffle, 
awarded to one group at random after the study completed (to put this in context, a cinema ticket 
cost ~ 120 Rupees). An anonymous reviewer requested additional detail on the competence in 
English language and academic ability of the subjects. English is the official language of India, and 
fluency in English was a criterion for recruitment. Participants all were educated to college level in 
English and if in work, the workplace used English as the primary language of communication, as 
they also interact with international companies. All participants were educated at least to an 
undergraduate level (or pursuing the same). 
Materials 
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As in the studies under replication, Reading the Mind in the Eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) 
was again used to assess empathizing. To assess individual IQ, we used the Wonderlic (1992) 
Personnel Test (Form A), as used by Woolley et al. (2010), study 2. This measure consists of 50 
multiple-choice items testing spatial, verbal and mathematical ability, with a test time of 12 minutes. 
Individuals score one point for each item answered correctly. Scores are highly correlated with those 
of other intelligence measures, for example, an average correlation of .92 with scores on the WAIS 
has been reported (Wonderlic, 1992). 
Group Tasks: The five group-tasks were chosen with reference to information on task 
loadings and correlations on the collective intelligence factor shown in supplementary tables S1b 
and S3b of Woolley et al. (2010). The principal factor loadings reported in supplementary table S1b 
for five tasks common to their study 1 and 2 were high to moderate for three tasks (.80, .72, and .61 
for Group Matrix Reasoning, Brainstorming (uses of a brick), and Group Typing respectively), 
lower for plan-shopping trip (principal factor loading .48, correlation with the collective intelligence 
factor .32) and unacceptable for one (principal factor loading of .10 for Group Moral Reasoning). 
Based on these results, we selected the first three tasks and supplemented these with two tasks also 
used in Woolley et al. (2010) study 2, namely Incomplete Words and Word Completions which 
showed correlations with the collective intelligence factor of .60 and .28 respectively (see Woolley et 
al., 2010, Table S3b). All tasks are described below.  
Two tasks assessed Generation. In “brain-storming”, groups were asked to generate as 
many alternate uses of brick as possible within 5 minutes, with a point scored for each novel use 
they wrote down. In addition, they were given the verbal fluency task (termed word completions by 
Woolley et al., 2010)), asked to produce as many English words as they could think of that start 
with the letter s and end with the letter n within a time limit of 5-minutes. One point was allocated 
for each correctly spelled unique word.  
To measure “choice”, the groups were given the 11-item ICAR Project matrix reasoning test 
(Condon & Revelle, 2014) as a group-IQ test, with a 10-minute time limit. One point was scored for 
each item answered correctly. In addition, groups completed the “Incomplete words” task used by 
Woolley et al (2010). A set of 36 words with 2-3 letters missing was provided, and the groups were 
asked to complete as many as possible within 5 minutes (e.g. “_u_ition” could be correctly completed 
as “audition”). 
To measure “negotiation” and “execution”, the groups were asked to participate in a Group 
Typing task, wherein each participant was provided with a hard copy of a difficult text-paragraph. 
The group then was given 10 minutes to simultaneously type as much of the text as possible into a 
shared online google-docs document. The group was scored based on how percentage-correct of the 
completed passage at the end of the allotted time. 
Procedure 
Participants were met in a receiving room where they gave informed consent, and were 
assigned at random to a group of 3 people prior to entering the testing environment. A total of 40 
groups were tested. Groups were tested in a private room, with facilities supporting testing of up to 
three groups simultaneously. Participants first completed the individual IQ test, then joined their 
group and completed the 5 group tasks in a randomized order. A research assistant was assigned to 
each group, and they administered all 5 tasks to the group. The RA recorded conversational turn 
taking across the measures to allow a test of the hypothesis that more equal turn taking facilitates 
group-IQ. In response to a comment from a reviewer, we note that the group interaction was not 
videoed nor assessed using a proprietary AI-based digital sociometric marker system (as in Woolley 
et al., 2010 study 1 and 2 respectively), but rather was scored online. During pilot work, we 
ascertained that in these small groups of three people, taking of turns during the tasks was clearly 
demarcated, and took place at rates giving ample time for the RA to note down the occurrence of a 
“turn” in real-time with high reliability. After all tasks were complete, participants completed the 
Social Sensitivity (RME) task with items presented on computer monitor. Finally, participants were 
debriefed and given an opportunity to ask the researchers questions regarding the experiment. 
Results 
Means, SDs, and correlations for the group and individual measures are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Study 2 Measures: means, SDs, and correlations. 
 Group 
Uses 
Group 
MR 
Group 
Fluency 
Group 
Letters 
Group 
Typing 
Avg 
Individual 
Wonderlic 
Avg 
Individual 
RME 
Uses of a 
Brick 
1       
Matrix 
reasoning 
0.44 1      
Word fluency 0.56 0.59 1     
Missing 
letters 
0.66 0.64 0.8 1    
Group typing 0.31 0.36 0.25 0.28 1   
Individual 
Wonderlic 
0.57 0.75 0.75 0.87 0.49 1  
Avg RME 0.55 0.45 0.60 0.76 0.21 0.69 1 
Mean (SD) 12.62 
(6.51) 
6.62 
(2.46) 
18.95 
(8.1) 
62.48 
(22.17) 
195.05 
(68.89) 
17.07 
(7.4) 
20.53 
(4.33) 
 
To test our first hypothesis that group-IQ test scores would form a general group-IQ factor, 
we used Horn’s parallel analysis, which suggested a 1-factor model of the group-IQ tests (See Figure 
1). A single-factor model also fitted the data well (χ²(5) = 3.14, p = 0.678; CFI = 1.022; TLI = 
1.044; RMSEA = 0). For subsequent analyses, scores on this group-IQ factor were extracted from 
the factor analysis using Bartlett’s method. The group-IQ factor accounted for ~50% of group-IQ 
test variance. 
 
Figure 1: Parallel analysis of Group-IQ tests (Study 2). 
 
We next tested the role of individual IQ, proportion-female and empathizing using multiple-
regression as in study 1. A model with group-IQ as the dependent variable, and average age, 
average individual IQ, proportion-female and RME as predictors accounted for 85% of variance in 
group-IQ scores. Individual IQ was again a very strong predictor and highly significant (β = 0.74 
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[0.54, 0.94], F(1, 34) = 57, p = 8.6x10-09). Neither proportion-female (β = -0.04 [-0.18, 0.1], F(1, 
34) = 0.33, p =  0.57) (see Figure 2) nor communication  (β = -0.07 [-0.21, 0.07], F(1, 34) =  1.1, p 
= 0.30) were significant predictors of group-IQ. Both were in the wrong direction. Unlike in study 
1, RME scores were a significant predictor of group-IQ (β = 0.3 [0.11, 0.5], F(1, 34) = 9.80, p = 
0.003). 
 
Figure 2: Group-IQ as a function of number of women in the group (NS). 
 
Discussion 
Study 2 replicated support for a g-factor among tasks performed by groups, showing also 
however that this was closely linked to individual group member’s IQs. We again found no support 
for significant effects of number of women or of turn-taking on group-IQ. We did find an association 
of group-IQ with average RME score. On request from an anonymous reviewer that we 
acknowledge their thought that (at their request, the comments of the reviewer are not quoted but 
instead summarized) it is questionable if a raffle could motivate groups to cooperate, we can only 
state that subjects performed as a group and reported the possibility of a raffle-win to be rewarding. 
We note also that this post-hoc interaction with payment was not mentioned in the original paper. 
In our next study subjects are paid, so the theory that monetary reward is required for empathy to 
cause IQ can be tested there. This anonymous reviewer also suggested that the non-significant effect 
of turn-taking might increase to significance (which in this study would also require a sign reversal) 
if turn-taking was scored from video. We disagree, as in groups of three people, the exchange of 
turns was clearly identifiable, however others might wish to video the sessions and score them 
offline to test the hypothesis that this significantly alters the data and reveals an otherwise invisible 
association. Importantly, in the original study, the association of turn-taking with group-IQ did not 
survive incorporation of empathizing scores in a regression, rendering this question of marginal 
interest. 
This reviewer also suggested that (we paraphrase) the mean IQ of this group is far below 
and variance far above norms for the Wonderlic, and that this caused a stronger than expected 
correlation of individual-IQ and group-IQ. We considered this argument. The reviewer is 
hypothesizing that the large effect of individual IQ on group-IQ scores results from low mean and 
high variance in individual IQ. In evaluating this hypothesis, we would make two points. The mean 
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and SD of Wonderlic scores in the 1992 normative study were 21.06 and 7.12 respectively 
(Wonderlic, 1992). In the present study, the mean group-average of Wonderlic scores was 17.07 and 
SD was 7.4. It is false, therefore, to say that the standard deviation was far above that of the 
normative sample: Rather than being far above the normative SD, the sample SD was highly similar. 
Thus there is no range effect to correct. Moreover, the reviewers’ account of the large effect we 
observed of individual on group-IQ entails hypothesizing that, as we find, these variables do indeed 
correlate in the population, and contrary to the prediction from group-IQ theory, that this accounts 
for much of the variance in group-IQ. 
Turning to the claim that the present finding is caused by a lower mean Wonderlic score in 
this study compared to that of the Wonderlic normative sample, we highlight two considerations. 
First, unlike variances, mean differences have no effect on the value of a correlation. Thus a mean 
difference cannot induce a correlation between individual and group IQ. Second, we note that this 
comment from the reviewer implies an additional hypothesis, namely that individual IQ and group -
IQ are related, but more strongly at lower levels of individual IQ than at high levels of individual 
IQ. There is no support for this hypothesis in the data, but the apparent critique predicts that 
organizations seeking high group-IQ should select strongly on individual IQ to avoid low group-IQ, 
which, again, contradicts the group-IQ theory prediction that individual and group-IQ are largely 
independent. 
To increase our power to model effects among these variables, we next completed a third 
replication study identical to study 2, but conducted in the UK instead of in India.  
Replication Study 3  
In study three, we sought to gather further evidence on the relationship of individual and 
group-IQ and to better understand the mechanism of this association. Note: in addition to 
replicating the identical suite of group-IQ tasks used in study 2, we added a questionnaire (the moral 
foundations questionnaire (Graham et al., 2009) and an experimental manipulation (conducted after 
the study was completed). These were constructed to allow us to explore the claim that “groups that 
had smart people dominating the conversation were not very intelligent groups” (Woolley & Malone, 2011, 
p. 2). After completing the replication study, groups were allocated at random to one of three 
conditions: authority, empathizing, or control. In the authority condition, the subject with the 
highest WPT score was selected to be group leader, and the rest of the group was instructed to 
allow this person to direct problem-solving and control decisions. In the empathizing condition, 
group members were instructed to ensure each person had an equal amount of talking time and to 
pay attention not only to what group members were saying, but how they were saying it. These 
interventions were prompted both by the novel result in study 2, and to test whether groups might 
seek to raise their IQ performance by adopting new habits. Whereas in study 2 we saw that 
communication was unrelated to group-IQ, here we contrast explicit promotion of an individual to 
coordinate group activity testing if this lowers group-IQ, and contrasting this with an explicit turn-
taking manipulation, testing if this raises group-IQ. 
Method 
Subjects. 
Forty teams of three participants were recruited from the general public in the city of 
Edinburgh, Scotland. Forty-four were male (76 Female) and ages ranged from 17 – 63 years (Mean 
= 24.23, SD = 9.01).  
Materials 
All materials were identical to that of study 2 with the addition of a final group-IQ measure 
taken after a manipulation encouraging either authority or empathy. For this purpose, the final set 
of the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM, Set E) was used. This test is a standardized 
measure of fluid intelligence (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998a). Groups were asked to complete the 
test as quickly and accurately as possible, and were given a 10-minute time limit. The number 
correct and time taken to complete all items was recorded for each group. 
Procedure.  
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Procedures were identical to those of Study 2: Subjects were welcomed into the testing 
room, where they completed the ethics. Next, subjects completed the same Wonderlic individual 
intelligence test, and RME. They were then formed into groups and completed the same 5 group-IQ 
tasks as were used in Study 2 to assess group intelligence. Group compositions by sex were 1, 14, 
13, and 12 for no women, one, two, and three women in the group respectively. The RAs remained 
in the testing room, but as part of their instruction, participants were told to ask all questions before 
the task was started and before we started timing. During the task, no assistance was provided. 
Because we had hoped that group personality-linked differences would emerge, an 
experimental manipulation was planned. Though no group-IQ differences emerged which were not 
well modeled by individual IQ, this manipulation which occurred after the main study was complete 
is recorded here for completeness. After the group-IQ replication was complete, groups were 
randomly assigned to either control (n = 14 groups), empathy (n = 14 groups) or authority (n = 12 
groups_ manipulation. Both experimental groups were told “we are testing a new strategy that has 
proven to enhance performance in previous studies”. In the empathy-inducing manipulation, the 
instructions emphasized the role of emotional understanding and empathy towards one another. 
These groups were asked to ensure that each person in the group received an equal amount of 
talking-time, that no person was to dominate the group and, lastly, to pay attention not only to what 
their group members were saying, but how they were saying it, that is to focus on one another’s 
body language, facial expressions and tone.  
In the Authority manipulation condition, subjects were told that “evidence showed the best 
leadership strategy was one in which one individual shoulders the leading role” and that a leader would be 
chosen based on their ability at the IQ task. The person with the best WPT score was appointed 
group leader. Groups were asked to allow the leader to direct problem-solving and make the 
ultimate decisions. They were asked to try and work cohesively under the assigned authority. No 
intervention/strategy was provided to the control group. They simply were asked to undertake a 
final task together. After instruction, groups in each condition then completed the Raven’s Standard 
Progressive Matrices (SPM, Set E) items. 
Results 
The test scores again showed the positive manifold characteristic of IQ (See Table 3) and a 
parallel analysis again indicated a single factor accounted for the score data. Scores on this factor 
were again computed for each group.  
 
Table 3: Study 3 Means, SDs, and correlations for the group and individual measures. 
 Group 
Uses 
Group 
Raven 
Group 
Fluency 
Group 
Letters 
Group 
Typing 
Avg 
Individual 
Wonderlic 
Avg 
Individual 
RME 
Uses of a Brick 1       
Group Ravens 0.18 1      
Word fluency 0.39 0.12 1     
Missing letters 0.17 0.24 0.61 1    
Group typing 0.19 0.14 0.06 0.02 1   
Avg Individual 
Wonderlic 
0.32 0.38 0.71 0.54 -0.04 1  
Avg RME 0.12 -0.15 0.34 0.28 -0.16 0.33 1 
Variable Mean 
(SD) 
21.05 
(5.52) 
7.5 
(1.8) 
24.8 
(6.78) 
83.58 
(10.82) 
23.01 
(2.84) 
25.46 
(3.9) 
26.55 
(2.56) 
 
As in study 2, we tested if communication, number of women in the group, or emotional 
empathizing were associated with enhanced group-IQ using linear models with Group-IQ scores as 
the DV. To avoid any suppression of these variables’ effects, only age was covaried. No significant 
effects were found for communication (β = 0.01 [-0.37, 0.40], t = 0.06, p = 0.95). Neither was any 
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significant effect of number of women in the group on group-IQ. To further explore links of group-
IQ to gender makeup, we tested linear (β = 0.18 [-0.15, 0.52], t = 1.11, p = 0.27) and quadratic 
effects (β = -0.033 [-0.42, 0.35], t = -0.17, p = 0.86) but none were significant.  
We next tested the effect of RME. In a simple linear model predicting group-IQ, and 
controlling only age, mind in the eyes reached significance (β = 0.37 [0.05, 0.70], t = 2.34, p = 
0.025). We then tested the predicted independence of this effect from individual IQ by adding 
individual IQ to the model. The effect of individual IQ was large and highly-significant (β = 0.67 
[0.42, 0.92], t = 5.52, p < 0.001). Contrary to prediction, adding individual IQ had the effect of 
rendering RME non-significant (β = 0.15 [-0.10, 0.41], t = 1.22, p = 0.23). 
Finally, before moving to combine the data from study 2 and study 3, we analyzed our 
attempted experimental manipulation of group-IQ via instructions to the groups to either obey the 
brightest person in the group, treating them as an authoritative leader (authority condition), to 
attend to each other, ensuring that all subjects were listened too (empathizing), and comparing these 
conditions to a control group. To test this manipulation, we ran a multiple regression, predicting 
group-Ravens score (the new group-IQ test) with average age, IQ, and empathizing as well as the 
manipulation as predictors. There was no evidence for any effect of the authority/empathy 
manipulation (F(2, 34) = 1.14, p = 0.33). The standardized (β) effects of the Authority and 
Empathy conditions relative to the control condition were in fact both negative (i.e., worse: -0.42 
(95% CI[-0.98, 0.15], t = -1.5, p = 0.142)  and  -0.13 (95% CI[-0.68, 0.41], t = -0.5, p = 0.620 
respectively). We do not, however, place to much emphasis on this result for the following reason. 
Our choice of Raven items allowed several of the groups to reach ceiling-level scores, suppressing 
group-IQ variance. Interestingly under these conditions, average IQ also only "approached 
significance" (F(1, 34) = 2.92, p = 0.097), indicating that one factor which might suppress effects on 
group-IQ is ceiling or floor effects. 
We next moved to combine the datasets from studies 2 and 3, and to generate a model 
which best accounts for the roles of RME and IQ on group-IQ.  
 
Joint Structural Modeling Study 2 and Study 3 data 
Because studies 2 and 3 used identical test materials and methods, we were able to combine 
these into a single data set, controlling for study, to gain power and to use structural equation 
modeling to directly compare competing models of the causes of group-IQ. We note that an 
anonymous reviewer suggested that the studies should be left separate rather than be combined. All 
the joint analyses reported below controlled for study origin, either in the regression analyses (as a 
covariate to account for differences between the study populations) or (in the case of the structural 
modelling) by regressing study out of the raw data prior to modelling. As in all previous analyses, 
we controlled for average age. 
The study covariate showed only very small, non-significant effects, validating the 
combination of data from the two sites. Importantly, the broad findings for each study individually 
replicated in the joint data. In the joint data, number of females in the group was not a significant 
predictor in a model controlling for study and age (F(3,74) = 0.99, p= 0.40). Neither were any of the 
linear, quadratic and cubic functions of number of females significant (p = 0.29, 0.12, & 0.72 
respectively). 
In a regression with group-IQ as the DV and study, average age, average IQ, and average 
RME as predictors, RME appeared to have a significant effect on group-IQ scores (β = 0.191 
[0.032, 0.349], t = 2.401, p = 0.019) Average individual IQ alone showed a powerful effect (on its 
own, controlling for study and age, accounting for 81% of variance in group-IQ (standardized beta 
0.86 [0.74, 0.99] (t = 13.6 p < 2×10-16: See Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Relationship of Individual IQ to group-IQ in the combined data from studies 2 & 3. 
 
If these linear models alone were used to guide our conclusions, it would be reasonable to 
conclude that numbers of women and turn taking do not affect group-IQ, that individual IQ plays a 
very strong role, but that RME does appear also to play a role, albeit much smaller than predicted. 
However, a more powerful method is available to test complex competing models of the relationship 
of individual predictors of group-IQ and the latent variable they form with individual IQ and 
empathizing, and we next turned to structural equation modeling to formally test 4 alternative 
models. 
A Structural Model of group-IQ 
A key advantage of the SEM framework for testing models is incorporating a measurement 
model for latent traits such as group-IQ. This allowed us to test not only how our predictors jointly 
affect each other, but crucially allowed testing whether RME is associated with the latent group-IQ 
factor, or with specific group-test variance, distinct from this factor. A specific recent example using 
SEM for this purpose can be seen in a test of the hypothesis that education raises general ability or 
acts directly on individual school subjects Ritchie, Bates, Der, Starr, and Deary (2013). We next 
outline the 4 distinct theoretical models for the data, taking advantage of this latent-variable SEM 
approach. 
Four alternative models of the origins of group-IQ performance 
The alternative models we tested are shown in Figure 4. In model A, group-IQ is proposed 
to result from individual differences in empathizing. In model B, only individual IQ affects group-IQ 
variance. Model C combines both effects, with group-IQ modeled as reflecting both empathizing and 
individual IQ, with empathizing also loading on individual IQ, reflecting the association of these two 
traits. This model is the one perhaps suggested by multiple regression approaches, with both 
individual IQ and individual RME traits acting to raise group-IQ. Finally, model D suggests a very 
different causal situation. In this model, only average individual IQ affects group-IQ. Empathizing 
has no effect on the latent group-IQ factor, but is allowed to affect one or more single test scores. 
Each of these models was built and compared using OpenMx (Neale et al., 2015) and umx (Bates, 
2014; Bates et al., 2017) packages in R (R Core Team, 2016). 
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Figure 4: Four Models contrasted. A: group-IQ results from differences in empathizing. B: Only 
individual IQ affects group-IQ. C: group-IQ reflects both empathizing and individual IQ. D: Group-
IQ reflects of individual IQ. Empathizing is also part-dependent on IQ, but has zero effect on group-
IQ. 
The results of these comparison models were as follows. Model A, in which mind in the eyes 
was used to account for group-IQ fit poorly (χ²(537) = 105.65, p < 0.001; CFI = 0.601; TLI = 
0.301; RMSEA = 0.312), and significantly worse than any other model tested. Viewing Group-IQ as 
emerging from empathizing alone, then, provided a very poor fit to the data. Modeling group-IQ 
entirely as consequence of variance in individual IQ (model B) fit significantly better than model A 
(AIC 2237.0 vs 2320.1), but did not reach modern standards of good fit (χ²(537) = 22.52, p 0.032; 
CFI = 0.955; TLI = 0.921; RMSEA = 0.105). Modeling group-IQ as an outcome of both IQ and 
mind in the eyes (model C) also failed to generate an acceptable fit (χ²(536) = 20.14, p 0.043; CFI = 
0.961; TLI = 0.926; RMSEA = 0.102). This model also did not fit better than model B (χ² (1) = 
2.39, p= 0.12).  
Best fitting model: No effect of empathizing on the group-IQ factor  
The best fitting model was model D, in which empathizing was constrained to have no 
impact on the latent group-IQ factor, and instead was allowed only to co-vary with individual IQ 
and to influence single group-IQ tasks directly (as opposed to being mediated via the group-IQ 
latent trait. We could not determine in advance which traits RME might affect, and so tested a 
model in which RME was allowed to load on all the group-IQ measures. This model did not fit 
significantly better than the model B (Only IQ influencing group-IQ) (χ² (5) = 7.12), p = 0.21), 
suggesting that not all paths from RME to specific manifests had appreciably improved model fit. 
We next sought, therefore to remove the unnecessary paths. Inspecting the fitted model showed 
clearly that paths from RME to all but the missing-letters task were small, and these were dropped 
without significant loss of fit (χ²(4) = 2.76, p = 0.60) and with an improved AIC which decreased 
from 2239.8 to 2234.6. This new model fit better than model B (χ² (1) = 4.36, p = 0.037) and 
became our best candidate, with better fit than all alternative models (χ²(536) = 18.16, p = 0.078; 
CFI = 0.969; TLI = 0.942; RMSEA = 0.09). Preparing a final best-fitting model, we examined 
modification indices. These suggested three manifest covariances might be added, and this yielded a 
well-fitting model by modern criteria (χ²(533) = 9, p = 0.342; CFI = 0.996; TLI = 0.989; RMSEA 
= 0.039). This best-fitting model is shown in Figure 5. The added covariances are in-line with 
contemporary hierarchical intelligence test theory (Carroll, 1993) in which group factors lie beneath 
general ability. These should cause some quadrants or group-IQ to associate more with each other, 
as observed. The model estimated the residual variance of group-IQ as zero after accounting for 
individual IQ (i.e., all paths shown in Figure 5 are free and show their maximum likelihood values). 
This meant that group-IQ could in fact be modelled as completely determined by average individual 
(residual variance set to 0.0 and the path from average individual IQ to group-IQ fixed at 1.0) with 
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no change in fit (χ ²(2) = 0, p = 1.000) and yielding an economical model with high-fidelity to the 
data (χ²(535) = 9, p = 0.53; CFI = 1.00; TLI = 1.00; RMSEA = 0). 
 
Figure 5: Best fitting model of Combined Study 2 and 3 data. 
General Discussion 
The three studies reported here and, especially, the joint modeling cast important light on 
the origins of high cognitive performance in groups. Rather than a small link of individual IQ to 
group-IQ, we found that the overlap of these two traits was indistinguishable from 100%. Smart 
groups are (simply) groups of smart people. By contrast, we found little to no evidence for two 
proposed causes of group-IQ: numbers of women in the group and turn-taking, and found evidence 
for a weak and specific impact of RME on one group task, but not on latent group-IQ. These 
findings are elaborated on below. 
The finding that IQ and group-IQ can be set equal bolsters studies reported in work-
performance showing that groups of bright individuals outperform groups of less able individuals 
(Devine & Philips, 2001). We take this work to a new level, suggesting that, in terms of latent 
group-IQ, group performance reflects nothing beyond individual contributions to average IQ. Thus 
we found no support for the hypothesis that “group intelligence [has] relatively little to do with 
individual intelligence” (Woolley & Malone, 2011, p. 2). 
We were able to conduct a direct test of the causes of group-IQ examining if this factor 
“appears to depend both on the composition of the group (e.g., average member intelligence) and on factors that 
emerge from the way group members interact when they are assembled (e.g., their conversational turn- taking 
behavior)” Woolley et al. (2010, p. 688). Across the three studies we saw no significant support for 
the hypothesized effects of women raising (or men lowering) group-IQ: All male, all female and 
mixed-sex groups performed equally well. Nor did we see any relationship of some members 
speaking more than others on either higher or lower group-IQ. These findings were weak in the 
initial reports, failing to survive incorporation of covariates. We attribute these to false positives. 
The equal performance of groups irrespective of gender is in-line with previous findings that men 
and women have near-identical mean IQs (though males have greater variance) (Deary, Irwing, Der, 
& Bates, 2007), and the strong dependency reported here of group-IQ on individual IQ. The present 
findings cast important doubt on any policy-style conclusions regarding gender composition 
changes cast as raising cognitive-efficiency. 
Comparing the present results to those previously reported 
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Our multiple regression results in study 2 (but not in study 1 or study 3) yielded an 
apparent correlation between group-IQ scores and average empathizing scores as measured by the 
RME. In an innovation not used in the original reports, we tested this relationship using an SEM 
approach. Unlike regression, this was able to discriminate specific-test effects from an association 
with the group-IQ latent trait. Translating the data into this SEM framework gave a very different 
interpretation of the link of group-IQ with empathizing. Model comparisons revealed that 
empathizing performed inadequately (Model A) as an explanation of variance in group-IQ. In our 
preferred model (see Figure 5), RME effects on group-IQ tasks were reduced to a single, low 
magnitude, test-specific effect on the missing-letter generation task. It might be that the task of 
deciding which missing letters complete a valid word involved components of 
cognition/collaboration specific to this test, and tapped by RME. 
In terms of outcome discrepancies, the original report of a modest apparent role for 
empathizing in group-IQ can be accounted for within the model supported here. First, the reported 
social underpinnings of group-IQ are far from complete: correlations with group-IQ of only around r 
= .2 were reported for proportion of females and turn-taking variables, and ~.3 for social sensitivity 
Woolley et al. (2010). Importantly, only the link to social sensitivity was significant in their full 
models. Thus what is in question on the social hypothesis of group-IQ is around 10% of shared 
variance between group-IQ and social sensitivity. As reflected in our data, to the extent that social 
intelligence is an intelligence (Locke, 2005), it is both correlated with individual general IQ, and 
contains some trait-specific variance. A parsimonious explanation of why regression models might 
show social sensitivity correlating with group-IQ, then, is captured in our final model (see Figure 5) 
–social sensitivity is itself modestly associated with high personal IQ. A specific linkage of 
sensitivity to a single group task that weights this more heavily is also represented, with no impact 
of social sensitivity to group-IQ. 
Less clear is why we found a strong link from individual average IQ to group-IQ scores 
across three independent studies, reaching identity in our combined model, when the original 
reports estimated this association at < .3. We attribute this to two factors. The first is the use of 
structural modeling that captures and represents covariation among multiple variables which 
regressions cannot. If this were the only factor, however, previous researchers should also have 
found a heavy dependence of group-IQ on individual IQ. We can only attribute the discrepancy to 
some factor limiting the validity or range of the IQ measures in Woolley et al. (2010) (the only other 
report (Engel et al., 2014) did not measure individual IQ). Ceiling and/or floor effects in testing, for 
instance, could suppress the link between individual IQs and group-IQ. Accepting this model also 
seems more parsimonious given the by now very wide validation of the biopsychosocial development 
and mechanisms of individual IQ (Bates, Lewis, & Weiss, 2013; Hill et al., 2014) as well as its 
general nature, and strong links to performance: Individual IQ appears, therefore, as an adequate 
account of novel problem solving in groups (as opposed to longer-term cooperative implementation 
of such novel ideas, which likely involves cooperation and conscientiousness). 
Limitations and future directions 
Power 
A reviewer argued that, despite our combined studies all showing the correlation among 
group tasks and detecting effects of cognitive ability predicted to be weak, the studies suffer 
unacceptably low power and were unsuitable for publication given conventional standards for high 
power in peer-review. We respond to this claim in three parts. First, it is, sadly, not the case that 
power is uniformly above 80%. For instance Button et al. (2013, p. 365) found “the average statistical 
power of studies in the neurosciences is very low”. Second, Study 1 of the paper we are attempting to 
replicate (Woolley et al., 2010), published in Science, used n = 40 groups, as did our study 2. All of 
this would not matter, however, if we lacked power to detect the effects under study – power, indeed 
matters. We therefore address this question in more detail here.  
Importantly, in this set of three studies, we are not testing against a so-called null model, 
where a claimed effect is simply not found to be significant. Instead, we are able to compare two 
competing models: That proposed by Woolley et al. (2010) which predicts that individual IQ has a 
negligible impact on group-IQ, while empathizing has a large effect, and the competing model which 
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we develop here based on the outcome of Study one. In our model, individual IQ has a large effect 
and empathizing does not impact on general ability. We can thus compare model fits as well as 
compare significance of individual parameters. A lack of power would lead to a lack of 
discriminability between the two models, but, in a world where empathizing has a strong effect, 
would favor recovery of that model across the studies. However, across all three studies we found 
significantly better fit for the individual-IQ model of group-IQ versus the empathizing or sex or 
turn taking models. We were reliably able to detect effects of individual IQ which were predicted to 
be vanishingly small, while simultaneously seeing estimates of empathizing effects, claimed to be 
much larger than those of individual IQ, estimated as most likely at or near zero. Confidence in the 
results is further buttressed by our replication of the predicted correlation among individual group -
IQ tasks: The general factor emerging from these was detected in all three studies, and all group-IQ 
tests loaded significantly on the factor. Finally, the power in the combination of study 2 and 3 to 
detect the effects proposed for empathizing exceeded 95%. We therefore find the claim that we 
lacked power to detect a predicted large effect to be internally inconsistent with our reliable 
detection of effects predicted to be smaller, and not compatible with either the single study outcomes 
or the three results taken jointly. 
Did we, in fact, undertake a replication? 
A reviewer concluded that we (paraphrasing) need to… remove any claim that [we] 
undertook a replication. Regarding whether we have undertaken a replication, we direct readers to 
our use of the IQ tasks used in either Woolley et al. (2010) study 1 (Matrix reasoning) or study 2 
(Wonderlic), our use of the same measure of empathizing (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), and our use of 
group-IQ tasks selected from among those used in Woolley et al (2010) as performing best in that 
work (see above, study 2, methods for task-choice rationale). The reviewer suggested that our choice 
of tasks shown by Woolley et al. (2012) to be the best measures of collective IQ in fact caused our 
failure to find any role for empathizing in group IQ. We see no logical mechanism for such as effect: 
picking good measures is instead a strength of this study. It is the case that we were unable to 
replicate the measurement of turn-taking in Wooley et al, 2010 study 2 which recorded n = 47 
groups using sociometric badge technology and an in-house proprietary algorithm identifying 
individual speakers in sound streams digitized from the badges, then identifying algorithmically 
when an individual stopped speaking while another started, then began speaking to segment the 
multiple sounds streams and, ultimately tabulate turn taking. Instead, we identified turns taken by 
each of the three group members by marking down when each member took a turn speaking. In 
these small groups marking down each turn taken proved reliable and relatively effortless. This 
difference of counting how many turns were taken live, rather than from recorded tape, prompted a 
reviewer to insist we delete all analyses of conversational turn-taking (the same reviewer requested 
us in fact to delete all of study 2). Perhaps future researchers will experiment with these recording 
methods and generate a measure of their inter-correlation. Here we simply highlight for the reader 
that, in the Woolley et al. (2010) studies, turn-taking provided no independent prediction of group-
IQ, rendering the point moot. Given that in the original report turn-taking was viewed as an 
outcome of social sensitivity (which rendered turn-taking effects non-significant), it is unclear if 
improved assessment of this proximal variable is warranted given the lack of effect of social 
sensitivity.  
 
Unidentified moderators 
An anonymous reviewer suggested that (paraphrasing) there clearly must be an unidentified 
moderator which accounts for why individual IQ and collective intelligence correlated so strongly. 
Readers should evaluate this claim for themselves. It is far from clear to us that an unidentified 
moderator “must” exist. As noted above, the original report showed an association of individual IQ 
with group-IQ, the association of empathizing reported was comparable to that found here, and the 
reported effects of sex, and turn-taking were non-significant in models with suitable covariates. As 
discussed above, moderators such as mean or variance in individual IQ, or differences in culture 
cannot account for the effects found here without substantively modifying the original theory: For 
instance, to claim that there is a strong link of individual IQ to group-IQ at IQ levels around 90, but 
not at IQs of 100. Critically, such post-hoc modifications cannot be invoked consistently across the 
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three studies without mutual contradiction, e.g. with the replication result from the UK. Instead we 
suggest the most cogent analysis is that the proposed moderators were not in fact operative and the 
data show consistent effects across study (e.g. Figure 3). 
 
More general considerations for future study of IQ in groups and organizations. 
Human performance in groups has been a topic of the highest interest (Simon, 1997) over a 
long period of time (Bouchard, 1969). Alongside models of cognitive ability (Deary, Spinath, & 
Bates, 2006), cooperation and competition (Lewis & Bates, 2010; Lewis & Bates, 2011; Lewis & 
Bates, 2013; Lewis & Bates, 2014), and systems for cumulative culture (Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, 
Thierry, & Laland, 2012), the solving of novel problems in groups must rank among the most 
practically important of topics available in psychology (Wechsler, 1971). Much of course has yet to 
be learned. Here we mention just two possible directions for extending work on the role of cognitive 
ability on problem solving in groups. 
It is important here to distinguish very broad concepts such as “successful teams”, judged by 
long-term implementation of agreed goals, from specific constructs such as group-IQ. The group 
sizes used in group-IQ research are very common in small teams. They are nevertheless much 
smaller than those assembled in human innovations such as companies, cities, nations, and armed 
forces. The periods of time involved are also brief, and the outcome measure (novel problem solving) 
is only one component of organizational success. Organizations universally involve complex sets of 
norms and rules, working toward agreed goals, and extended lifespans. It would be valuable to 
extend studies of IQ to examine performance in these much larger groupings, and involving 
contributing to a group goal or norm-maintenance (where altruism and agreeableness may be 
important: Lewis & Bates, 2011; Lewis & Bates, 2014), or over longer periods of time (where, for 
instance individual conscientiousness may be relevant for extended or multi-stage tasks: Jackson et 
al., 2010; Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, & Goldberg, 2007). 
It is interesting also that groups did not perform better than individuals – a genuine group-
IQ might be expected to enable problem solving to scale linearly (or better) with number of subjects. 
In group-IQ tasks, coordination costs appear to prevent group problem-solving from rising even to 
the level of a single individual’s ability. This implicates not only unsolved coordination problems, 
which are well-known barriers to scale (Simon, 1997) but also reiterates the finding that the 
individual problem-solver remains the critical reservoir  of creativity and novel problem solution 
(Shockley, 1957).  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, across three studies groups exhibited a robust cognitive g-factor across 
diverse tasks. As in individuals, this g-factor accounted for approximately 50% of variance in 
cognition (Spearman, 1904). In structural tests, this group-IQ factor was indistinguishable from 
average individual IQ, and social sensitivity exerted no effects via latent group-IQ. Considering the 
present findings, work directed at developing group-IQ tests to predict team effectiveness would be 
redundant given the extremely high utility, reliability, validity for this task shown by individual IQ 
tests. Work seeking to raise group-IQ, like research to raise individual IQ might find this task 
achievable at a task-specific level (Ritchie et al., 2013; Ritchie, Bates, & Plomin, 2015), but less 
amenable to general change than some have anticipated. Our attempt to manipulate scores 
suggested that such interventions may even decrease group performance. Instead, work 
understanding the developmental conditions which maximize expression of individual IQ (Bates et 
al., 2013) as well as on personality and cultural traits supporting cooperation and cumulation in 
groups should remain a priority if we are to understand and develop cognitive ability. The present 
experiments thus provide new evidence for a central, positive role of individual IQ in enhanced 
group-IQ. 
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